The role of the UK Supreme Court as conventionally understood is to give effect to, and not to challenge, the will of Parliament. At the same time, the UK's constitution forces the UKSC to develop a constitutional jurisprudence to resolve clashes of higher-order principles, for instance between parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. This development puts the legitimacy of unelected and unaccountable judges invalidating legislation under the spotlight. Instead of arguing for US-style strike-down powers, I argue that cautious and corrective judicial intervention is constitutionally mandated and democratically legitimate.
bodies to constitutional standards and putting Parliament on alert that it could conceivably do the same for legislation.
I am not claiming that the UKSC is morphing into a legislative third chamber or is equipping itself with legislative strike-down powers, but nor do I accept that the UKSC Justices understand their role as mechanically giving effect to parliamentary intention.
Instead, the UKSC operates under the competing demands of autonomy and constraint: it is institutionally independent from politics, but must generate and secure its own kind of legitimacy through adherence to law and the constitution. Autonomy requires interpretative parity with Parliament over the constitution. 4 Legitimacy involves complex value judgements in areas where law meets politics, as where individual justice clashes with public policy.
David Robertson defines constitutional review in liberal democracies as "a mechanism
for permeating all regulated aspects of society with a set of values inherent in the constitutional agreement the society has accepted". 5 This definition fits with judicial review in the UK at the highest level as well. This overlap in turn gives rise to the well-known clash between a system of independent judicial supervision of parliamentary legislation and the principle of electoral democracy. The literature largely dismisses the possibility of "exceptional circumstances review" in the context of oppressive or arbitrary legislation on the basis that such review lacks authority and justification in constitutional law. 6 My response is that judicial intervention in hard but non-exceptional cases, i.e. those that involve a clash of higher-order principles, is already a feature of the UK's constitutional landscape. Since judicial review cannot be justified with reference to constitutional law, I will shift the focus and ask instead whether it can be justified with reference to democracy. I will discuss the merits and demerits of judicial review in the next section. I then fall back on literature to examine the role of top courts in constitutional democracies. Finally, I explain how a significant number of Justices utilise the creative tension between autonomy and constraint to assert the UKSC's jurisdiction over hard cases and complex questions. I argue that the obstacles to exceptional circumstances review are gradually being eroded, that the UKSC is likely to assert its authority over more cases and issues in the future, and that sound reasons for judicial intervention meet the requirements of democratic legitimacy.
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CONSTITUTION
Paul W. Kahn bases the legitimacy of every legal order on two standards: a standard of will, according to which law is grounded in popular consent; and a standard of reason that corrects procedural and substantive deficiencies. 7 In the USA, the question whether a judicial body that was not elected by and is not accountable to the public should invalidate majoritarian policies is polarised by camps that are broadly rights-sceptic (standard of will) and rights-foundational (standard of reason). On one end of the spectrum, Alexander Bickel 8 and Jeremy Waldron 9 stand for a position that regards constitutional review as an illegitimate constraint upon the principle of political participation. It limits the equal right of citizens to take part in and influence the political decision-making processes that give rise to the laws with which they have to comply. Writing about the USA, H.L.A. Hart described judicial review of legislation as an "extraordinary judicial phenomenon" that is "particularly hard to justify in a democracy". 10 John Hart Ely saw the main issue with judicial review of legislation being that "a body that is not elected or otherwise politically responsible in any significant way is telling the people's elected representatives that they cannot govern as they'd like".
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Michael Perry reminds his readers that in a democracy electorally accountable government is "axiomatic", whereas judicial review requires "justification".
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The other end of the spectrum, exemplified by Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls, deals with the two institutions separately. Judicial review of legislation is legitimate in so far as it involves an appeal to individual rights and constitutional principle, which set out the parameters within which political power may be legally exercised. 13 The legislature, by contrast, ought to make use of policy when enacting laws to advance the public good and society at large. On this view, the courts and Parliament are not rival institutions but, in their own ways, both engaged with what Rawls calls "the idea of public reason", i.e. the idea of a stable constitutional democratic society. 14 The role of the court is not limited to checking the process of legislating, but should also ensure substantive compliance with democratic values.
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In the UK the absence of constitutional review greatly weakens the equivalent positions.
One branch of the debate argues that the doctrine of ultra vires performs a democratic requirement in giving effect to parliamentary will. A rival branch counters that the principles of judicial review (illegality, irrationality, impropriety, proportionality) were created by the common law, developed by courts, and have little or nothing to do with parliamentary intent. The essential dividing line between supporters and opponents of the ultra vires model is as to how far legislative intent can provide a satisfactory explanation for the norms which constitute judicial review. 16 These two positions are, in any case, not beyond reconciliation. The modified ultra vires doctrine assumes that Parliament intends to legislate in accordance with judiciallyenforceable rule of law criteria that include individual rights and principles of good governance. 17 Judges already look for express statutory words to empower a public body to act contrary to fundamental principles. 18 Independent courts are needed, on this view, to protect individuals and minorities from the will of the majority.
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Of course there is more to these domestic debates. The point is that most political constitutionalists do not decry judicial review as "illegitimate" or regard it as a "deviant institution" 20 and most legal constitutionalists do not advocate for the "rule of law courts" or judicial supremacy. The arguments for and against judicial review are made within the constitutional framework, and not in opposition to it. Alison Young considers the literature on legal and political constitutionalism in greater detail. She concludes that for the most part the differences are a matter of degree, not kind. There is significant overlap between the rival camps regarding human rights protection and the need for judicial review, and they end up favouring either legal or political controls. On the question posed at the outset, whether an account of the judicial role can be given that is consistent with the principle of majoritarian government, Young finds "no conclusive proof for any argument" and suggests that the supposed rivalry amounts to little more than a labelling exercise. 21 Adam Tomkins also accepts the validity of both positions: it is undemocratic for unelected and unrepresentative judges to rule over constitutional questions, but judicial intervention is also an essential corrective against democratic pathologies, e.g. a temptation by the majority to violate minority rights.
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One recurring theme, however, is the conception of courts in opposition to the legislature. Their differences are obvious. Parliament is the proper institution to enact generally-applicable legislation on the basis of public consultation and deliberation. Courts are the proper forum for resolving disputes between private litigants. Whereas legislation applies prospectively and determines the future direction of society, judicial decisions apply retroactively to events that occurred in the past.
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However, it does not follow that all legislation is presumptively democratic, or that a judicial decision that rivals statutory law is undemocratic on the grounds that judges are unelected. This oppositional stance results in a zero-sum game in which "courts are always cast as the villain in the democratic piece". 24 The connection between the court's unelected composition and the illegitimacy of constitutional review is taken for granted when it is precisely that connection that has to be challenged in order to ascertain whether the courts' review function is indispensable in a constitutional democracy.
The two institutions also have more in common than is commonly assumed. The previous section shows how the examination of judicial review in a constitution that is structurally imbalanced by the existence of two rules of recognition (parliamentary sovereignty and the common law) involves 'paradox, conflict, ambiguity, and unresolved tensions'. 35 This deadlock needs to be broken. The question in this section is whether analysing judicial independence on the presumption of democratic legitimacy generates different themes. The scholars I have selected broadly contribute to "judicial institution building", which Crow understands as "the creation, consolidation, expansion, or reduction of the structural and institutional capacities needed to respond to and intervene in the political environment". 36 The emerging themes outline a finely balanced justification of judicial review that protects democracy's structural conditions, respects the UKSC's institutional capacities, recognises a need for cautious and corrective intervention, and that is rooted in a deep concern for democratic legitimacy.
Judicial Review and Democracy's Structural Conditions
The first justification for judicial review lies in protecting democracy's structural conditions, which contradicts Bickel's claim that judicial review is essentially undemocratic. It also goes against Ely's primary concern with preserving the integrity of majoritarian legislative procedures. Electoral legitimacy, which stresses the equal rights of political participation of citizens and majoritarian decision-making, is clearly the base line. However, a decision does not become right because a group of persons reaches it by simple or special majority rules.
Samuel Freeman, a legal philosopher, does not assume that the links between judicial review and democracy exist. 37 From the outset, Freeman constructs a conception of democracy as a form of sovereignty rather than as a form of government. The form of government is based on a procedural understanding of democracy that is defined by the basic requirements of universal franchise, free and fair elections, equal representation, and majority rule. 38 It is a standard of will. By contrast, the form of sovereignty assumes the existence of "structural requirements" and the "background conditions" of stable democracies, as well as the "normative requirements of the values and ideals" that underpin democratic institutions.
39
It is a standard of reason. Form and procedure represent necessary but insufficient conditions for legitimate law-making: democracy's structural requirements must also be satisfied. These stem from the recognition of civil and political rights that support the equal freedom and independence of citizens. In particular, Freeman mentions "whatever rights are necessary for free and informed political deliberation and public discussion", such as freedoms of speech and association. 40 Utilising the social contract theory of Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Rawls, Freeman identifies rights and procedures as democratic if they "promote the good of each citizen and maintain the equal rights that constitute their democratic sovereignty". 41 Democracy, in short, is a form of sovereignty that is justified by a social contract of the people.
37 S. Freeman, "Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review" (1990-1991) 9 Law and Philosophy 327-370, 328. 38 Freeman, "Constitutional Democracy", 337. 39 Freeman, "Constitutional Democracy", 336. 40 Freeman, "Constitutional Democracy", 350. 41 Freeman, "Constitutional Democracy", 350.
The constitutional system generates its own procedures for determining the legality of political decisions. However, these must be complemented by independent criteria for assessing the legitimacy of those decisions, which are provided by the democratic system.
The constitution of a democratic society straddles a procedural concern for legality and the formal equality of individuals, and a substantive concern for legitimacy according to which people determine and pursue their own conception of a good life in accordance with general social rules. Democracy allows people to rule themselves in Rawlsian fashion by enacting laws on the basis of principles that everyone can accept.
In light of the above, Freeman welcomes judicial review of legislation as a precommitment of free, equal, and rational citizens, under which "citizens provide themselves with a means for protecting their sovereignty and independence from the unreasonable exercise of their political rights in legislative processes". 42 Taking democracy's infrastructure "off the legislative itinerary" is not undemocratic: judicial review of legislation only limits "ordinary legislative power in the interest of protecting the equal rights of democratic sovereignty". 43 After all, if democracy emphasised only equal political rights and rule by majority there would be no incentive to obey the law. Without constraints, majoritarianism threatens the idea of a legal system. Courts may be imperfect institutions, but they provide citizens with a "means for protecting their sovereignty and independence from the unreasonable exercise of their political rights in legislative processes". 44 In conclusion,
Freeman highlights in what circumstances democratic judicial review can be distinguished from undemocratic judicial review.
There is nothing undemocratic…about the judicial review of laws that infringe against the equality of such fundamental moral rights as liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of association, freedom of occupation and choice of careers, political participation, and more generally, the freedom to pursue one's own plan of life. Judicial review is undemocratic when it contravenes majority decisions in order to maintain the power and legal privileges of elite social and economic classes against social change and economic reforms designed to enable each citizen to achieve independence and to effectively exercise these fundamental rights.
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These are the choices: either the absence of electoral accountability or political will is equated with the absence of democratic legitimacy, or judicial review on the basis of legal principles is one of the choices made by pre-committed, free, and equal citizens to protect their sovereignty and independence. Either democratic theory is merely about establishing the rights and principles according to which citizens wish to be governed, or it also includes constitutional mechanisms for their protection. For Freeman, courts are the appropriate institution, and judicial review a sensible mechanism, to uphold democracy's structural conditions.
Judicial Review and Representation
The second justification for judicial review is representational, which has an experiential and a constructive component. The experiential aspect demands some form of social acceptance.
On the one hand, the complete absence of social acceptance would be fatal for any public institution: "[n]o institution can survive the loss of public confidence, particularly when the people's faith is its only support". 46 On the other hand, courts should not be pressured into 45 Freeman, "Constitutional Democracy", 367-68. securing mainstream public opinion or "specific support" for individual cases. Public disagreement with a judicial decision does not equate to withdrawing support for the judiciary as an institution. As representational organs, then, courts depend on "diffuse support", i.e. broadly favourable public attitudes even when the public disagrees with the outcome of a specific case. 47 However, the more important task lies in the construction of courts and judicial review as 'representation of the people'.
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The central point underpinning Kahn and Freeman is that democratic government combines will and procedure with reason and structure. Christopher L. Eisgruber, a constitutional scholar, embraces the dualism by refuting the received wisdom that only elected legislatures are qualified to make decisions on behalf of the people. Eisgruber refashions the judiciary (and the US Supreme Court in particular) as "a sophisticated kind of representative institution". 49 Judicial review ought not to be conceived negatively as a constraint, but positively "as one institutional mechanism for implementing a complex, non- Improving public discussion by framing political issues in terms of reasons and principle, and not influence and will, contributes a further democratic justification for judicial review.
Judicial Review and Time
The by "public reasons recognised in the community and should therefore be amended or rejected". 74 Judicial review necessarily brings representation clashes to the fore: the government speaks for the majority or popular opinion (political will), the courts stand for the permanent interest of the people (constitutional principle). 75 Rosavallon stresses that "[a]ny regime based on universal suffrage suffers from the fundamental flaw of mistaking the majority for the whole, and it is the job of the courts to stand as a constant reminder of this." 76 Second, Rosanvallon links the courts' representational function to time. Courts are not just adjudicators in individual cases but, by developing rights and principles, participants in democratic deliberation. As norm-developing institutions, courts "reconstruct the history of the law" 77 and gradually produce a "collective memory". 78 For Kahn, judicial opinions are a special form of legal self-justification. "They are designed to be read in an indefinite future, with the expectation that they will invoke in the reader a continuing loyalty to the rule of law". 79 This is echoed by Rosanvallon, for whom courts fulfil two related functions. they are "the guarantors of the promises that community makes to itself"; and "they preserve the identity of democracy over time". short-termism is a necessary condition of the political system rather than the failing of individual politicians. To counteract the constant perils of short-termism, which viewed from the future appears as "the dead hand of the past", 82 Rosanvallon underlines the need for timeless constitutional principles. Decisions need to be made on the basis of norms and principles, which in turn generate their own social acceptance and legitimacy.
Rosanvallon overcomes the tired binary trade-offs of conventional constitutional theory. Constitutionalism is not the opposite of democracy, but its necessary condition.
Courts and elected institutions do not operate antagonistically, but as components of a unified framework. 83 Judicial review and parliamentary decision-making are "complementary procedures for expressing the general will": one has immediate effect, the other operates 77 …the judge is a kind of legal paragraph-machine into which one throws the documents on a case together with the costs and fees so that it will then spit out a judgement along with some more or less valid reasons for it […] . 85 By contrast, in England, Weber continues, the shaping of law is a practical process that casts the judge as a less mechanical but still rule-bound political actor. Normative stability in the common law is generated by judges who are bound by precedent. The doctrine of precedent connects the past to the present and the future. Principles become timeless due to their systemic connection and continuity. On the one hand, the practice ensures certainty and predictability, or in Weber's phrase "calculable schemata". 86 On the other hand, it still provides some room for manoeuvre. Judges "…work the past so as to realise its present possibilities for future innovation". 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UKSC
In the final section I want to show that the UKSC is increasingly committed to the three reference points (structural conditions, axiomatic representation, and historical process) that were outlined in the previous section. The UKSC has approached a number of recent cases with reference to ex ante principles, such as the rule of law and the separation of powers, rather than solely on the basis of legislative intent. This is not a case of Justices simply articulating their personal preferences into law -a near-impossible proposition within the context of a judicial institution. 88 Rather, constitutional law compels them to speak in an idiom that embraces rights and principles as "inherent and fundamental to democratic civilised society". 89 Additionally they draw on time to articulate legal history and collective memory: "We are not making it up as we go along, but building upon the centuries of law and jurisprudence which make up our national narrative". and reasoning from the top-down, it follows that a judicial decision must bind all the parties to it, including the executive, and that a government decision is generally reviewable by a court of law at the suit of an affected citizen. 101 Lord Neuberger also sets much store by the fact that the disclosure order had been issued by a tribunal whose legitimacy reflects
Rosanvallon's values of impartiality, reflexivity, and proximity: i) its decisions are subject to appeal; ii) it had particular relevant expertise and experience; iii) it had conducted a full 99 hearing with witnesses; iv) it was a public tribunal which heard full adversarial argument; v) the decision of the tribunal was closely reasoned.
R. (Evans) v Attorney General
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By contrast, the dissenting opinions of Lord Hughes and Lord Wilson, which defer to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, appear timid and unconvincing. 103 Lord Hughes agrees with the proposition that Parliament would not ordinarily empower a government minister to override a judicial decision, but goes on to state that "Parliament has plainly
shown such an intention in the present instance". 104 Acknowledging the central importance of the rule of law, Lord Hughes concludes that "it is an integral part of the rule of law that courts give effect to Parliamentary intention". Lord Wilson, similarly, bases his dissent on "the most precious" constitutional principle of "parliamentary sovereignty, emblematic of our democracy". 105 However, this position is flawed for authorising a member of the executive to veto a decision by a court or tribunal.
The disagreement falls neatly within the framework provided by will and reason, or ultra vires and the rule of law. One side of the argument is typified by judges who defer to the plain meaning of the statute in combination with executive discretion at the behest of Parliament. The other side is characterised by judges who seek to uphold the principle of legality, who resist the plain meaning approach, and who insist that ministerial discretion be controlled by reason and deliberation. Rosanvallon's phraseology, Lord Neuberger's reconstruction of legal history dating back to the mid-nineteenth century evokes the common law as collective memory. Similar to a constitutional court, the UKSC emerges as "dialogical partner" and "public reasoner" that challenges the political branches to engage with its reasons and arguments based on certain community promises that have stood the test of time. 109 The crucial difference is that it does not have the final say on the substance. In its response to Evans, the Independent Commission on Freedom of Information did not attack the UKSC's decision, but
recommended that "the government should legislate to put beyond doubt that it has the power to exercise a veto over the release of information under the Act". 110 For present purposes, the normative concern (the validity of judicial decisions) coupled with the structural condition (rule of law), the institutional condition (impartiality and independence), and the temporal condition (precedent) justify to legitimise the exercise of judicial review.
Tenuous in Evans, the timeless quality of principles of justice is clearer in the sevenmember decision by the UKSC in Unison. 111 In this case, employment tribunal fees introduced by the Lord Chancellor using delegated legislation were deemed unlawful. The UKSC distinguishes the principle of imposing fees on the basis of primary legislation from the effect of the fees imposed, which was to render unaffordable a person's right to access courts and tribunals. Lord Reed, who delivered the unanimous judgement, approaches the case by linking the Lord Chancellor's power to impose fees to "constitutional principles which underlie the text", the most important one being the constitutional right of access to justice. 112 Access to courts is inherent in the rule of law -although this is, as Lord Reed caustically points out, "not always understood" by the government. 113 A common misconception is that courts and tribunals provide a service that is of benefit only to the "users" who appear before them and who should, therefore, pay to use the service, rather than to society as a whole. Speaking to that mistaken belief, Lord Reed delivers an object lesson on the rule of law and on the relationship between Parliament and the courts. In particular, he stresses that without the right of access to the courts …laws are liable to become a dead letter, the work done by Parliament may be rendered nugatory, and the democratic election of Members of Parliament may become a meaningless charade. That is why the courts do not merely provide a public service like any other.
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Lord Reed's reasoning connects to structural requirements, to enduring principles, and to the court as a representational body ("public service" 122 -cases, which according to one commentator, mark a turn to "autochthonous constitutionalism").
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It is important to note that the enabling primary legislation in Unison "contains no words authorising the prevention of [judicial] access". In the absence of clear and express statutory authorisation, the UKSC unanimously deems the delegated legislation ultra vires on the grounds that it effectively prevents individuals from having access to justice. 124 As with
The final case exposes a lack of institutional confidence when pushed to the brink by primary legislation. "… while the legislature is there to reflect the democratic will of the majority, the judiciary is there to protect minority interests, and to ensure the fair and equal treatment of all". nature of the assisted dying debate". 160 However, he also concludes his judgement with a strongly worded rebuke of Lord Sumption's deferential position. Lord Mance stresses the court's "constitutional role" in addressing a variety of public and private interests. While judges are bound by the formal constraints of legal principle, reasoning, and precedent, they also need to be alert to structural conditions: "very little, if any, judicial decision-making, especially at an appellate level, is or ought to be separated from a consideration of what is just or fair". 161 As a representational organ, courts need to consider the social risks to, and moral convictions of, the wider public in addition to the values of individual autonomy and dignity.
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Assessing Nicklinson is complicated by the full panoply of judicial responses. The view of Lord Hughes that assisted suicide "is very clearly a decision which falls to be made by Parliament" 163 stands in contrast to Lord Neuberger's concern that "such an approach would be an abdication of judicial responsibility". 164 Yet in addition to deciding the case and differing over a s.4 declaration of incompatibility, the judges also reflect on the constitutional role and institutional competence of the UKSC. In that respect at least the judgment is more self-assured. 
CONCLUSION
How should courts respond in cases involving constitutional principle and fundamental rights? Amidst constant reminders that the doctrine of sovereignty has not disappeared, the cases examined here show that consensus about automatic deference to Parliament or other public bodies is crumbling. The UKSC decides fundamental rights issues independently and authoritatively, although not always consensually. Evans reveals how the judges themselves were torn between deciding this case either with reference to rival constitutional principles or administrative law technique. Nicklinson exposed similar disagreement over the correct protection of human rights.
Nonetheless, the cases suggest an approach to judicial review that falls between USstyle strike-down powers and deference to legislative intent. At their most interventionist, judges operate not as drivers, but as mechanics; not armed with a map, but with the tools of constitutional doctrine; and tasked not with steering, but with keeping the machinery of democracy humming. 165 Instead of invalidating the statute on constitutional grounds, the judges could even give the machine "a jolt designed to nudge the machine back into working order, a good whack with the judicial wrench". 166 The corrective method allows the UKSC to articulate the meaning of the UK constitution independently from politics but without usurping parliamentary supremacy.
The UK constitution gives rise to complex questions on which the UKSC Justices may not agree, but which they also can no longer evade. The cases discussed are not isolated ones, and they foreshadow a more assertive and astute approach to judicial review by the UKSC. An honest discussion of the court's work is needed to recognise these questions as compelled by the UK constitution, and to understand the heightened role of the UKSC as mandated by constitutional democracy. 165 Metaphor borrowed and adapted from C. J. 
